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ardware-reliability engineers have H long been able to design a hardware 
system to a target reliability by determin- 
ing the reliability of system components or 
allocating reliability budgets to compo- 
nent developers. Software engineers can 
also design for reliability, but they seldom 
do because they view the process as too 
complex or not applicable to software. 
With the growing emphasis on reuse, 
however, and the need to demonstrate that 
the software to be reused is indeed reliable, 
they can no longer afford to shy away from 
reliability planning. 
To make reliability planning and certi- 
fication more accessible, we developed an 
approach based on the use of three math- 
Developers often view 
software reliability as 
unapproachable. But an 
increased understanding 
of planning and 
certification activities can 
help in selecting models 
and manipulating them in 
reliability analysis. 
ematical models - the samphg,'~z com- 
p ~ n e n t , ' ' ~ ' ~  and ~ r t i f i ~ ~ t i o n ~  models - 
although other models may be equally 
suitable. This approach, which helps re- 
duce reliability analysis to a problem that 
can be evaluated and manipulatedthrough 
a series of spreadsheets, addresses the 
three reasons we believe most developers 
avoid these activities: 
+ They do not differentiate between 
planning and certifylng and the tasks asso- 
ciated with each. 
+ They 6nd it difficult to chose from 
among the many available reliability mod- 
els. 
+ They find the mathematical models 
difficult to manipulate for what-if analyses. 
J.H. POORE 
University of Tennessee 
HARLAN D. MILS 
Softwore Engineering Technology 
DAVID MUTCHLER 
University of Tennessee 
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'l'hc first reason is the result oftrying to 
apply concepts that are relatively i iew to 
software engineering, tlic second steins 
from a lack o f  consensus al)out reliahility 
itself, and the third niay he caused by a lack 
oftools for manipulating model results. 12s 
part of our experiment, we tieveloped a 
systein to handle all the calculations in a 
sprcxlshcct fomiat. 
Our approach has three aspects, which 
adclress these reasons for avoidance. I:irst, 
w e  believe that developers need to thor- 
ou gh 1y undcrst;i n tl the tasks i nv( h e  (1 in  
planning and certification. Second, amied 
with that insight, they can choose a reli- 
ability inodel similar to the ones we (le- 
scribe here. Finally, they can dcvclop ;I 
sprcxlsheet system similar to our own to 
manipulate model results in enlightcning 
what-if anal yscs. 
This approach was motivated h y  our 
interest in applyins the Cleanroom soft- 
ware-engineering method in cnviron- 
mcnts that require extensive cotlc reuse. 
'livo niodcls for certification. incliicliii~ 
ment. You can also use it to ;issess a 
p r o p i n ' s  fitness for use b y  condiicthg 
cxperimcnts to cstahlish empirical cvi- 
'I'hese clual uses o f  reliahility have 
slightly different definitions. Kcliahility as 
dence of quality. 
of rclialiility nieasurcment, can lie a key- 
stroke, work session, transaction, con- 
plctcd telephone call, or any other unit of 
performance appropriate to the senkc  the 
sohvare i s  expected to perforni. 
'1;) q u a n t i ~ ~  reliatdity in a meaningful 
way, s o h w r e  LISC niiist lie motlcletl as a 
r'incloiii process in which a use i s  selected 
according to some p-ol)al)ility distrihu- 
tion, or  UJC div+rihh. Reliahility then lie- 
comes the prohahility that the s o b w e  
will pcrfomi according to specificadon for 
ware hils to meet specification during use, 
a failure O~CLII-S.  
Kcliahility can bc a useful i i ictr ic. You 
3 randomly selected use. LVl1en the soft- 
moclules or units that compi-ise t l ie sys- 
tem. Other models eshniate or ~ircdict 
1 system reIia1)ility without regml to what 
the system colnf"scs. 
PLANNING VERSUS CERT~F~CAT~ON 
'T'iine c m  lie execiition time, calcnd.ir 
tinie, number of inm-ucnons executed, 
numl)er of input cases, or numl)er ofuses, 
to name the niost coliinion interpreta- 
tions. 'I'hesc conclitions represent a coli- 
stant failure rate. 
Using the definition that re1i;iI)ility is 
tlie prol)al)ility that the sohvarc will give 
die correct result for a single, randonily 
chosen (according to the use distribution) 
use, then the nicm time to failure is the 
average number of  uses hetwen failures. 
M n ' F  a n d  relihility c a n  be related 
mathein;ltically in the models. 
Some models deal with system relial)il- 
ity (in all uses ofi'svsteni," we are referring 
the one we used in our experiment, arc dresses the design ofsoft- 
wx-e that will operate ac- 
cording to specification 
for 21 period of time. Rut 
you can also use a simpler 
part o f  accepted (:Ieanroom practice.'-s 
WHAT IS RELIABILITY? 
1,ikc hardware reliahility, softwarc rcli- definition ~ reliability is 
ability is l ~ ~ d  on modes off'iilure. F lard- I -  t l ie 1)robahility tliat a rx- 
ware niodcs of failure - wear, design 
flaws, and unintentional environmental 
phenomena ~ are more tangihlc I )eciuse 
hardware is a physical entity. In fact, it i s  
-~ 
.~ 
this very physical quality that prompts 
hardware designers to assume that lim- 
ware cannot b e  perfect. Ironically, the 
same designers often assign perfect rcli- 
ability to a sohvarc coiiiponent I)cca~~sc it 
can't "wear out," for example. 
But software docs have a mode of fail- 
ure, which is Iiased o n  the assumption that 
design and dcvclopmcnt are not  perfect 
processes. 'l'he mistakes made during 
these processes manifest a s  faults in the 
code, which arc revealed as inp~its arc pro- 
cessed. 'I'hat is, a failure occurs when the 
soh \we  does not pcrfomi according to 
sl~ecification for an input history. 
'Ilius, like hardware, software is 
deeniett reliahle in relation to its use ;ind 
intended perforniance. Use, the hisic unit 
re I i a hi I i ty pl a m i  ng and 
certification is Imcd on 





~ I L I T ~  AS hasic ideas: 
t Systems are coni- 
tOBABlUM poscc'~ of components. , USE WILL t Component  reli- 
ICESSED + Svsteni reliahilitv 
ability can h e  mcasurcd. 
CORRECTLY. can he calculated from 
tise this simpler defini- 
tion hecnuse it  is well 
suited to the idea of conducting experi- 
mcnts to cstahlish empirical cvidcncc of 
qudity. I t  also proves to be a very conser- 
vative notion of reliability, well suited to 
tlealing with die reuse of softwii-e for 
which little may lie known about the pro- 
cess of  its develop~iicnt hut much may lie 
known ahout its operational history. 
In t l ic timc-l)ascd definition ofrcliahil- 
ity, tlie choice of  time as the random van- 
a l k  is l y x c t l  on the idea that rmdonily 
selected uses (according to a use distri1)u- 
tion) will cause paths through the Iirograni 
encountering a fault in the cotle increases. 
~~ 
cornponent intomiation. 
may t)c based on a differ- 
ent model froin that used in rcliahility 
planning. 
t System ccrtific'ltion 
Systems are composed of components. We 
define a system as a collection of programs 
and system files such that tlic system files 
1 and altered only hy the pro- 
c collcction. TIUS definition i s  
not intended to nile outsystenis, Init is given 
to tstahlish the hundaiy of responsibility. 
Clcirly, if tiles are :dtered by agents outside 
the system, we cannot vouch for the conse- 
quences. ' I  licse progrCinis and system filcs 
arc what we mean hy components. C h i p  
prognnis, or  files. 
nents n1ay he systems, Inodul~ ,  lxickages, 
I 
~~~~~~~ ~~ ~ ~ 
~~ ~ 
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An additional constraint on the system, 
to satisfy a technical assumption of one of 
the mathematical models, is that it must be 
proper. A proper system must have a single 
entry and a single exit, and for each execut- 
able component there must be a path from 
the entrance through the component to 
CALCULATING THE METRIC$ 
tion models are based on the relationship of reliability and the 
tncltn time to Failure. b17TF is thc averagr number ofuses be- . .. . . _  
'I'he mathematics ofthe sampling, component, and certifia- 
this interplay, so that you can assess the ~ 
effect on the reliability of the system as a 
whole. The quality of component infor- 
mation must be good enough to support a 
determination that it is the best among 
alternatives, including a newly developed 
component. 
In this type of testing, the testing pro- 
cess constitutes a statistical experiment. It 
consists of processing a random sample of 
test cases selected according to intended 
system use to present empirical evidence 
that the system performs correctly. The 
statistical qualities of the testing process let 
1 Reliability 2 y  c o " ~ " " f ' '  9: tween failures. Time is measured as the number of uses (or test 
cases). Reliability is related to M?TF by 
M7TF= 1 - rehability ! 
If time is interpreted in any other way, the relationshp is 0.95 45 59 90 135 
0.99 230 299 459 688 MTTF= 
0.999 2302 2995 4603 6905 
0.9 
1 - reliability 
where L is the average number of time unis per use. By d e h g  
L, you can choose an arbitrary time unit or convert various time 
units to a common one and move easily between MTTF and 
reliability. 
use &tribUtion) and is 
of tests is m, the minimal number to ensure that unreliable soft- 
ifno hilures occuT. ne number 
the exit. 
If a system is being planned that will 
comprise new and reused components, in 
the final analysis you will either use or not 
use a specific component. You can make 
this binary decision on the basis of some- 
what crude information. In particular, you 
must know or  conjecture how the compo- 
nent will interplay with the rest of the sys- 
tem and what its reliability will be during 
In reliabilityplanning, you must model 
the interaction of all system components 
- an inexact activity. %le the error in 
this process is bearable for reaching the 
binary decision to use or not use a given 
component, it need not be accepted in cal- 
culating final system reliability. For this 
reason, we recommend that you indepen- 
dently certify the completed system on the 
basis of statistical use testing. 
Sanpling model If lo@ is the percentage of confidence you want 
in the experiment, the number of test cases that must run without 
a failure to report a reliability of ris 
you make scientific statements about the 
predicted reliability of the system, in es- 
sence certifymg it. 
' Component rekability. The quality of in- 
formation about the component must be 
good enough to support your decision to 
use or not use it. There are many sources 
of component information, and even a 
crude form of any of these may be enough 
Number of test cases = r ~ ';:;;I 
The 100c-percent confidence means that if you adopt this test- 
ing method and test software frequently, it is almost certain that 
the claims would be true at least lOOc percent of the time. This is 
not the same as saying that the claim is right with probability c, 
there is no probability involved in the claim itself because a claim 
is either right or wrong. As Table A shows, you can obtain addi- 
tional confidence without greatty increasing the number of tests; 
additional reliability, however, does require large increases in the 
number of tests. 
This formula uses a zero-failures certification method. The 
software is tested on m random test cases (chosen according to the 
ware is not certified too frequently. 
Another approach is to test mk random test cases, where k is 
any nonnegative integer, and certify if at most k failures are found. 
mk is chosen just as m was; it is the minimal number of tests that 
ensures that unreliable software is not certified too frequently. For 
example, to allow up to two hilures, and certify with 90-percent 
confidence that Y is at least 0.99, you must run 53 1 test cases. 
You can compute mk numerically for any k and for the other 
parameters as follows: mk must satisfy 
Pr(k or fewer failures in mk mals I actual reliability < r )  < 1 - c 
where Pr is probability. The smallest m that satisfies this require- 
ment is the smallest m such that 
m T) ?&ry%(l-C) 
j x i - k  
You can then solve form numerically. 
The major disadvantage of this k-failwes method over the 
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to makc that 1)inat-y decision. 
developer hx hy reputation or contract 
asserted the component's reliahility, you 
niay I)e al)lc to use this assemon. 
t Dtwekptmt  mthorl. If a certain cle- 
velopnent method was used and that 
method includes 21 rcliatdity standard, you 
may be ahle to know the rcliatbility by 
knowing thc iiictliod. 
has tlcen verified tjy a mathenlatical proof 
of correctness, you may lie able to attribute 
a high degree ofreliahility to it." 
t 1;iell pj&timt~. If records of field 
use a n c l  f,iilurcs x c  availatde, ~ o t i  can csti- 
+ /le;dopn.:c ~-ct.o/-(Ls. If thc component 
t I~/~~/-oof ' /~ . f ' r . (~/- / -e~. t /7e~~.  If the component 
conduct a specific statistical testing exper- 
irncnt using the sanipliiig model as (le- 
scnhed in t l ic 110s on pp. W O 2 .  
nent rcliahilities, and transition proha- 
Iiilities, you can perfoini calculations in 
an enliglitcning what-if analysis. What 
System reliability. 'Ib calculate system re- 
lialdity using the coinponent motlel as 
shown in the 1)ox on pp. 90-92, you will 
need lioth estimates of component 
reliabili ties and thc structure of cornpo- 
nent interactions. 'l'he structure and rela- 
tive frequency of these interactions is de- 
termined I)y transition probabilities - the 
pro1)at)ility oftransition from one compo- 
nent to anotlier. You must estiinate transi- 
tion prohahilitics on the hasis of design 
' Component model. C;alcxilations in the planning spreadsheets of 
the CRAM are based on a Markov model. Hcre we present only the 
zero-failures method is that it requires niore tests. A second disad- 
vantage is that it certifies software with known errors; ifthe errors 
are corrected, the certification i s  no longer valid because the test 
was conducted on the software before the changes. The statement 
must apply to the software on whch the experiment was con- 
ducted. 
The advanage of the k-failures method over the XI-o-failures 
method is that the k-failures method \\ill deny certification less 
often. If the software has an M T F  of 500 with a goal M'lTF of 
100, the zero-failures method will deny certification more than a 
third of the time; the k-failures (two-&lures) method will deny cer- 
tifiation less than 10 percent ofthe time. 
'Thus, the sampling model can produce certification errors in 
two ways: First, it can certifv software that is, in fact, unreliable. 
Second, it can deny certification to software that is, in fact, reliable. 
The zero-failures method lets you control the likclhood of errors 
of the first kind 1)y setting the confidence level as desired. You can 
use the k-failures method to control the likelihood of errors of the 
second kmd as well by setting k large enough. I Iowever, you pay a 1 price for this ema control in more tests. 
i's execution. Fori = 1, ..., n and for-j = I ,  ..., 12,  'I; where component 
Tis interpreted as the successful termination ofthe system, de- 
if a certain coiiiponent were more or 
less reliat)le? How would that affect s y -  
tein reliability? \:hat if a certain con-  
potient were perfect, with a reliability of 
I .O? 
You cm also estimate the sensitivity of 
the total system to each component 
through what-ifanalysis. You can calculate 
system rcliability from coinponent infor- 
 nation, or you can stipulate a system reli- 
ability and calculate a n  allocated reliability 
to the components. 'l'he what-if analysis 
gives insight to tlic decision to use or not 
t',plj = probability that cornponentj will be execvted next if 
coiiiponent i is currently being cxccuted 
When i is fixed, p$ sum to rj. The model makes the Marko- 
vian assumption that transfer of control (to another component, to 
successful termination, or to unsuccessful tem~at ion)  is inn&- 
tionally independent of execution history. 
<:alculating system reliabilities and component sensitibities re- 
quires the following: For i andj from 1 to 72, define qz by n mamces 
G and H by Gy =pS and HV = ?*$y. Perform two matrix inversions 
to obtain S = (I -G)-' and T = (I - w-'. For i from 1 to 12, define 
column vectorsfBnd R by!; = qp,y,and R = 7: 
Because cvmponent 1 is the sole e n q  point to the system, sys- 
tem reliability R is RE. The sensitility of system reliability to the re- 




and is given hy 
3RI 7'1, 
Suppose you set a target system reliability Rtpt To meet it, the 
r, needed for component i, assuming all other components are reli- 
able, is 
; = K ,  
ri 
where 
You can use this formula to allocate reliabilities to the compo- 
nents. However, because allocated reliabilities yield a system reli- 
ability less than the target reliability, you must increase each allo- 
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to use a component. Coupled with the 
sampling model, it can show the scale 
and scope of effort needed to demon- 
strate the required levels of component 
reliabilities. Finally, it can shed light on 
the reasonableness of building a system 
to desired levels ofreliability on the basis 
of reusing a specific collection of com- 
ponents. 
parts and why or how they are used. A 
good certification model must focus on 
the performance of the system in statis- 
tical use testing and in field use. Expo- 
nential growth in MTTF is the goal in 
certification. 
System certification should be based 
on generating or selecting inputs and 
input hstories according to the system's 
intended use. To the extent that files are a 
System certifitation. Certification of a part of the system, you must acheve rep- 
completed system is based on a different resentative steady states in these files 
model from that used in planning, and through input hstories. You can conduct a 
the model criteria are substantially dif- statistical experiment to collect data points 
ferent. Developers must take responsi- on performance and use a reliability model 
bility for the completed system as an op- 1 to analyze them and predict system reli- 
erational entity, without regard for the abiliv. 
RELIABILITY MODELS 
To illustrate our approach, we used the 
sampling, component, and certification 
models, which have been useful in prac- 
tice." Each model has certain mathemat- 
ical properties, described in the box on pp. 
90-92. You can apply the models to your 
development process to the extent that 
your process is characterized by these 
properties. Because many aspects of plan- 
ning and certifying system reliability do 
not require an exact analysis, the models 
can be meaningful to your process even if 
they o d y  partially characterize it. 
Sampkng model. This model is useful for 
cated reliability somewhat to meet the target. 
CertmccltiOn mod$. In the certification model, M7TFk denotes 
the MTTF of version k of the system. Suppose that for all k, 
MTTFk = (B)(MTITk-,) where B is some constant. Then 
MTTFk =A&' where A = M7TFw 
The certification model has three independent aspects: 
1. The parametric form of&, which is used to estimate the 
2.  The corrected-log least-squares technique, which is used to 
3. The technique for obtaining the data points. 
You can estimateA and B directly from statistical data using ei- 
ther maximum-likelihood or least-squares techniques. However, 
the corrected-log least-squares technique is not only a better esti- 
mator but also a simpler computation. 
This technique starts with the original equation M?TFk = 
A$. You then take the logarithms of both sides to get 
M?TF of version k. 
compute A and B &om the data points. 
log(MTTFk) = logA + k(l0g B) 
By letting a equal log A and b equal log B, you can then rewrite 
log(Mmk)  = a + kb 
You can compute the estimates for a and b using standard linear 
regression. This minimizes the sum of the squares of the differ- 
ences between the logarithms of MTITo, ... ,M'ITFel and the es- 
timates for a + Ob, ..., a + (n - 1)b. To do this linear regression, take 
partial derivatives with respect to a and b, set them to zero, and 
solve the two linear equations that result. 
From the previous step, you have estimates a for logA and p 
for log B. Tentative estimates forA and B are ea and 8. The esti- 
mate of the MTTF for version dis ea(epy. However, this estimate 
is biased; its mean is not equal to the m e  value of A@. Using the 
the equation as 
model's assumption that the MTTF (measured by sampling) for 
version k is an independent random variable exponentially distrib- 
uted with mean&, you can cwmpute an unbiased estimate. 
To get confidence internals for various aspem of the curve 
&om a least-squares linear regression, assume that the residuals are 
independent and normally distributed with a mean of zero and 
common vmance of $. You can estimate this variance and then 
compute a confidence interval for the log-mnsformed data. 
The power of a model is the ratio of the released product's pre- 
dicted M'ITF to the number of tests. To estimate the power of the 
certification model, assume that the estimates ofA and B are exact 
and that all the data points lie exactly on the curve. Suppose that 
version n is released after versions 0 through n-1 have been tested. 
The estimated MTTF of version n is then AB"; the number of 
tests conducted is 
n- 1 
A$=- A(F  - 1) 
( B -  1) 
k=o 
so the power of the certification model is the ratio of the released 
product's predicted Ml"TF to the number of tests: 
which is equal to 
for B not near 1. As we described earlier, the power of the sam- 
p h g  model is about 1:2 at 90-percent confidence levels and less at 
higher confidence levels. Thus, ifyou do N tests under the certifi- 
cation model, you expect to do roughly 2N(B-1) tests to achieve 
the same level ofM'ITF certification under the sampling model. 
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I 
estimating tlie relialiility of a n  existing , 
component as an eiitity without rcgard to 
i t s  coinposi tion. 
In a siniple sampling experinient, you 
must draw a nuinher of test cases from I I 
tlie use distrihution ~ which mirroi-s ac- 
tual softuwc use - nin these test cases, 
and record the nuinbcr processed cor- 
rectly. Yoii can then report that the soft- 
ware has the estiinatcd reliability at 11 set 
pling model i s  that you can make a quan- 
titative claim ahout sofmai-e qii;ility suli- 
sampling error, which you can coi i trol ~ Fipre  1. '4 .rofirm .ywtli (1.r ti n~nrork u ~ ' ~ ~ J ~ t l ~ i ~ / ~ l ' ? l ~ . S .  E I ~ I / ~ ~ L ~ ~ C Y /  m, l~rhebd iritb 1t.5. tuittwio/, 
through a set corifideiice level, and error 
in the use distribution. i 
confidencc level. 'l'he appeal o f t h e  sam- 
ject to o n l y  two sources  c i f  er ror :  1 ~~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ - ~~ ~ ~~ 
/mhi/Ji/iy~ i i i d ~ c ~ t t s  thirt ~n/rtri i / ptir.i~.i fi-ii i i i iiiw u r q ~ u ~ i ~ w r  tri muther Ni / / i t i  d/mtj iui  u/.t,?ii, mwz' .  
level, the nnmher of tests required to 
deinonstrate a certain !M'l"ll~ is inore 
dmi mice tliat JWl'I"lY. Certification will 
often be denied Iiccwse of lxicl luck if die 
true M'1''I.F is close to tlie certified 
M'l"I'1~. For cxainple, if the certified 
s 100 and the mle ,IlT7% is 2 0 0 ,  
then certification at 90-percent confi- 
dence will h e  denied merely I)ecausc of 
chance iiiore tlian two-thirds of die time! 
E:veii if the mie M7TF i s  1,000, certiki- 
tion will still be denied more than 2 0  per- 
cent of the t ime. 
Because the sampling model i s  conser-- 
vative in its estimates, certification of un- 
reliable software is rare. But this very con- 
servatism coupled with the economic 
pressure to limit tlie numl)er of tests might 
deny certification to much sofhvarc that i s  
in hct quite reliable. Fomiriately, there are 
mathe i i la  ti a 1  W'I ys to c( i n  trol th c li kcl i- 
hood that reliable software is denied certi- 
tication, hut for the iiiost part you arc bct- 
ter off certifying thr system through 
statistical testing. 
Component model. 'I'he c o m p o n e n t  
model is usetid for estimating how the rc- 
liability of compoiients - tioth new and 
used - can affect system reliability. 
can calculate system relialiility from infor- 
mation bout the coiiiponents, or  you can 
stipulate a system reliability and calculate 
~ ~~ 
~ ~ ~~ 
~~~~~ ~ ~ 
~~ ~~~~~ ~ ~ 
the planner can use die component model 
fix what-ifanalyses. The  model's simplic- 
ity is hoth a strength ant1 ;I weakness. It 
makes the model easy to use, hut reliahility 
estimates may tie inaccurate. For tlie qual- 
itative decisions involvcd in planning sys- 
tciii rclial)ility, diis inaccuracy is accept- 
able. For ccrtitj-ing the complete system, 
however, a more accurate model i s  re- 
quired. 
Certification model. <~ertificatioii is essen- 
tially a statistical experiment to collect data 
points, which are die tiincs between hil- 
urcs on successive system versions or engi- 
neering-change levels. A c'urve is fitted to 
this data, which is meful in iiionitoring 
progress during developincnt and predict- 
ing the M'1"l'F of tlie released product. 
expoiientiall y over successive versions of a 
















T h e  certification model is more p o w  ~ G 
crh l  tl~m the sampling model, in that fiar H 
fewcr test cases arc required to certifi. the 
system fit a set rclialdity. Tt is also usually 
ni ore a cc ti r a tc t h a n  t h c coni po n e i i  t 
modeI, Iiut will yield poor estinutes ifthe 
ciin'c being fitted docs not, in fact, exhibit 
exp~jneiitial growth. A Ixmiiising altema- 
tivc to the certification moclel i s  the Mar- 
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APPLYING THE MODELS 
Figure 1 shows a system represented by 
a network of components. Each directed 
arc indicates that conml passes from one 
component to another in the direction of 
the arrow. There is a single point of entry 
into the system from the operating system 
and single point of r e m  to the operating 
system and, for each node, there is a path ~ the CEM will display given only transition 
from entry to exit that probabilities as input. The 
passes through that node CRM uses certain de- 
- the definition of a 
proper system. 
As we described ear- 
lier, you must estimate 
component-transition 
probabilities. In a well- 
designed system, com- 
munication among com- 
ponents is h t e d .  Table 
1 shows the transition 
probabilities for the net- 
you can learn some interesting information 
about how a component can affect system 
reliability. Managers can use th~s informa- 
tion to redunk the system's arhtecture and 
to plan resource allocation, for example. 
To assist in manipulating the necessary 
calculations for planning and certification, 
we designed the Cleanroom Reliability 
Manaper."Table 2 shows the information 
faults. For each compo- 
nent, the default reliability 
is 1.0, and the default con- 
you CAN TELL 
A LOT ABOUT 
fidence level is 90 percent. 
The defaults are displayed 
until the planner enters 
SYSTEM 
RELlABlllTY BY 
new information. LOOKING AT At the top of the table 
TRANSITION are system reliability, sys- 
PROBABILITIES. tem M n F ,  target reli- 
abilitv. and the test-scale 
work in Figure 1, listing 
the probability associated with each arc. 
T h s  information may also be represented 
as a m a ~ w i t h  a zero probability assigned 
to impossible transitions. 
Using just the transition probabilities, 
facto;.' The CRM calcu- 
lates system reliability from transition 
probabilities and component reliabilities. 
Since each component has a default reli- 
ability of 1.0, the entire system has a 1.0 
reliability. 
Ifthe reliability is perfect, the MTTF is 
undefined (because there are no &lures). 
Target reliability is undehed until the re- 
liability planner enters it into the CRM. 
Test-scale factor lets you equate one study 
to another when that is possible simply by 
scaling all data by a constant factor; it will 
remain 1 .O throughout this example. 
The  columns reliability, confidence, 
test cases, and MTTF are related mathe- 
matically, and you should interpret them 
collectively. For example, you would need 
an infinite number of test cases to demon- 
strate a reliability of 1.0, and you would 
have no failures on which to base an 
MTTE Test cases tells you how many test 
cases 570u must run without a failure to 
demonstrate the given reliability at the 
given level of confidence. You can enter 
either reliability or MTTF, whichever is 
more directly available, and the CRMwill 
calculate the other. 
Likewise, you can enter the number of 
possible or affordable test cases, and the 
CRM will show the reliability that such an 
experiment would demonstrate at the 
chosen confidence level. If you change the 
confidence level, the CRM will recalculate 
the number of test cases. If you enter a 
System reliability: 1 .WOO 
System MTTF: Undefined 
Target reliability: Undefined 
Tcst-scale factor: 1 .OOO 
J A N U A R Y  1 9 9 3  94 
System M-ITF: Undefined Test-scale factor: 1.000 
Allocated reliability 
~ - __ _ _  
Confidence Test cases MlTF Sensitivity 
_ _ _ _ p ~ p ~  ~~ - _ _ _ ~ _  
1 .OO (3)00 
A 1 .0000 0.900 Infinite Undefined 5.00 (3)80 
B 1 .0000 0.900 Infinite Undefined 10.00 (+)00 
c 1 .0000 0.900 Infinite Uiidefined 2.00 (3)50 
n 1 .0000 0.900 Infinite Undefined 10.00 (900 
E 1 .0000 0.900 Infinite Undefined 10.00 (4)00 
F 1 .0000 0.900 Infinite Undefined 9.00 (3)88 
G 1 .0000 0.900 Infinite Undefined 1.80 (3W 
H 1 .0000 0.900 Infinite Undefiiied 2.00 (3)50 
I 1 .0000 0.900 Infinite Undcfiiied 5.00 (3P0 
J I .0000 0.900 Infinite Undefined 4.00 (3175 
K 1 .0000 0.900 Infmtc Undefined 5.00 (3)80 
(3)75 
0.900 Infinite Undefined 
~ ~ ~~ 
infinite Undefined 4.00 
~_ I 1 .0000 0.900 - L ~~ ~ 
Module name Reliability 
1 .oooo 





( i )OO 
( 5 ) O O  
( 5 j00 



















change for any one of tlie four items, it 
calculates and displays an  appropriate 
change to one of the other three. 
The  CKM calculates sensitivity (sixth 
column) from tlie transition matrix. In our 
example, coniponent~ B, U, and F, havc 
the greatest effect on the total system. 
Thus, system reliahility is twice as sensitive 
to these coinponcnts as it is to A, I, and I<. 






2 3 0 1  
2301 
2302 57 























hllocatcd reliability (last column) is the 
rcliatiility allocated or butlgctcd to each 
coiiipoiient and is calculated whenever the 
target reliability is changed. The  allocated 
rcliatjility for each component is based on 
the target relid)ility for t l ie entire system 
and the sensitivity of tlie system to the 
coinponcnt. If some components have 
higher reliabilities than are budgeted to 
thein, the clemand on other conipoiients is 
~ ~~ ~ ~_ ~~ 











3 hi (3175 
4.56 (3)XO 
(3)7.< -3.6.5 




of  flexibility in wh;it-if analysis. If you 
change the target reliability, you uTill cause 
a rclia1)ility budget to be allocated to cach 
cmiponciit. YOLI can also change any one 
of reliatdity, confidence, test exes, or  
M'ITF for an indivi;idual component. By 
changing indiviclual component informa- 
tion, you will cxisc a change in the calcu- 
lated system reliat)ility and system M'1"I'F. 
Finally, if you ctiangc the transition prob- 
abilities assigned to network arcs, you will 
'I'hus, die CR\,I provides a goocl deal ~ change the sensitivities - the relative 
ative iniportancc to system reliability, 
rather than any ahsolute infonnation. 
lower. 
~ 
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~ System MTTF: 99.25 Test-scale factor: 1.OOO 
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zontributions of each component to the 
jystem's reliability. 
As an example, suppose you are certify- 
ing a system at 0.999 reliability, whch in 
the long run means we can expect one fail- 
ure in 1,000 uses. Using the CRM, you set 
the target reliability to the goal of 0.999 to 
produce the display in Table 3 .  To abbre- 
viate reliability figures and to draw atten- 
tion to the number of nines, the CFM 
displays 0.999 as (3)00, 0.99980 as (3)80, 
0.99999 as (5)00, and so on. 
Using the target reliability of (3)OO 
(0.999) and the known sensitivities, the 
CRV allocates a reliability budget to each 
component. If component reliabilities are 
set a t  the allocated levels, the system reli- 
ability will be slightly less than the target 
reliability because of the nature of the 
model. 
Adjusting component reliabilities. To illus- 
trate the relationshps just described, as- 
sume that you have the followinginfornia- 
tion on components A through L: 
+ CompanmtsA, B, C, D, E. New, to be 
programmed and certified at 0.999 reli- 
ability. 
G and I. Existing in a 
library with 0.99999 field-use reliability. 
Performance records are sufficiently well- 
established to justify h s  reliability claim. 
+ Component H. New, to  be pro- 
grammed and certified at 0.99999 reliabil- 
+ Components 3 and L. Numerical- 
function library packages with such an ex- 
















tied in asserting a reliability of 1 .O. (Assert- 
ing a reliability of 1.0 does not mean you 
can demonstrate or even believe that, 
however. The assertion is merely a way of 
taking a component with exceptionally 
high reliability out of play.) 
+ Coqmezt K. Existing in a libraly 
with such an extensive field-use record 
that we are justified in asserting a reliabil- 
ity of 1 .O. 
If you enter h s  component informa- 
tion into the model, you get the display in 
Table 4. The table shows that the reliabil- 
ity entries for components A through I 
have changed, which caused the entries for 
the associated test cases and A T M F  en- 
tries to change. Now, to demonstrate a 
reliability of 0.999 ((3 j00) and to have 90- 
percent confidence in the demonstration, 
you must run 2,301 test cases without a 
failure. Moreover, you might also require 
a similar demonstration for each new 
component (A through E). (Cleanroom 
takes a different and more efficient ap- 
proach, as we will show later.) This table 
shows that, under our deht ions ,  a reli- 
ability of 0.999 corresponds to an MTTF 
of 1,000 uses. 
Entries for components F, G, and I - 
which have well-established field-use re- 
cords justifymg a reliability of 0.99999 
((5)OO) - show the value of carefully docu- 
mented field performance. To demonstrate 
a 90-percent confidence level in tlus reliabil- 
ity, you would have to run 230,257 ran- 
domly selected test cases without a Mure! 
The table shows a system reliability of 
0.964 ((1)64), the same as an M T F  of 
J A N U A R Y  1 9 9 3  
9 - m ' ~  . , . 4  I :  * . I  . . .  . : t :  
Ss stem reliability (l)54 
5!steIll XI I'I 1; 21 0 2  
Module name Reliability Confidence Test cases MllF Sensitivity Allotafed reliability ~ ~~ 
Lmel -systen1 I 0000 0 000 I I1 tin1 t C  Undefineti 0.95 ( i )OO 
(4)OO 0 000 2 i o 2  i 10000 00 9 00 (4)OO 
Target reliability (3)OO 
T e + d e  f'lctor 1 000 ,~ 
~ 
~1 ( i ) O O  0 000 2 i o1  1000.00 18 2 5  ( + S O  
( 3  )OO 
(4)OO 
(4)OO 














3 3 0 2  5 
23025 
2 .i 0 2  -5 7 
2302  57 















I 3 .ox (4) i o  
14.53 (4)37 
36.36 (4) 7 5 
20 .00  (416s 
1 .oooo 0.000 Infinite Unticfinetl 9.00 (4)OO 
1 .oooo 0.000 Infinite Undefined 7.27 (1)87 ' ~~ P 1. ~ 
S i  stem reliability: (2168 
System M m F :  3 18.18 























2 302 5 7 
230257 
H (5100 0.900 230257 
I (5100 0.900 230257 
I 1 .0000 0.900 Infinite 
K 1 .0000 0.900 Infinite 
I, 1 .0000 0.900 Infmite 
28.09 uses, which the CK\I calculated 
from the network relationships and con-  
ponent information. Because the allo- 
cated-reliability column shows that soiiie 
cornponcnts with high sensitivities (K, 11, 
a n d  E) have lower reliahilities tlyan allo- 
cated, it should not be surprising tliat 
system relial)ility is less than target reli- 
a l d i t y .  
New coinponents B, D, and E (coinpo- 
ncnts A ancl C ,  aldiough new, have lower 
sensitivities) are ac~ually iiioi-e critic~l to q x -  
~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~ 
~~ ~ ~~~~~ _ _ _ _ ~  ~~~ ~~~~ 
I E E E  S O F T W A R E  
'Farget reliability: (3)OO 
Tcst-scale factor: 1 .U00 
















rein reliability than the reused compo- 
nents with wcll-estnl)lished records of 
highly reliable pelfornwice. In ' I i t k  5, 
the reliabilitics for coniponents 13, 1) and E 
have been incrcased, and, as you w o d d  
cxpcct, system reliability has also iii- 
creased. 
Adjusting system structure. 'Ihe inost filii- 
damenml chmge a planner can make is to 
revise the network that describes conipo- 
ncnt interaction. 'l'he iiiost raclical change 
~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~~ ~~~~ ~~ 














7.95 (3)87 l 
is to remov-e or adcl a node and associated 
arcs, which corresponds to ;I niajor arch- 
tcctural change. A less raclical change is to 
remove or add arcs - change the transi- 
tion probaldities without chan@ng the 
components tlieniselves - after carefully 
stiitlying and analyzing the system's in- 
tended use. Tilde 6 shows transition prob- 
atdities revised from those in Table 1 .'l'hc 
reliability information for Tihle 6 is 
showti in 'I'ahlc 7 (which contrasts with 
m11e 5). 
~~~~ ~~ _____ ~~~~ __________~ __________ ~~~~ 
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ersion Observed Predicted Predicted 




2 1 .OO (012 3 0.81 
3 16.00 (0)77 4.38 
4 560.00 (2)57 232.62 
0 






2 1.75 (0137 1.60 
3 11.00 (018 1 5.38 
4 37.00 (IN3 27.64 
5 49.00 (1188 86.47 
6 200.00 (2)68 316.52 
0 
1 1 .00 






- - 0 2 .OO 
1 1.50 
2 38.50 (1)78 46.90 
3 28.00 (2118 122.40 
4 12.00 80.95 
5 29.00 (2105 106.30 
6 87.00 (453 216.24 
7 200.00 (2178 472.58 
- - 
A change like h s  will definitely affect 
system reliability and component sensitiv- 
ities, as a comparison of Tables 5 and 7 
shows. Particularly important is that the 
relative values within each table are differ- 
ent, which may cause the planner to real- 
locate development resources. In Table 5, 
components B, D, and E affect system re- 
liability the most; in Table 7, components 
D, I, and J have the greatest effect. 
Also important is that the components 
in Table 7 have much higher sensitivities 
than those in Table 5. Tlus difference im- 
plies that  changes in  component 
reliabilities will affect system reliability 
more under the revised transition proba- 
bilities (as in Table 7) than under the orig- 
inal ones (as in Table 5). Table 8 shows 
what happens when component  



















































Cleanroom certification Continuing with 
the assumed component information, if 
you are going to enter the new compo- 
nents individually into a repository or li- 
brary, you must certify each one individu- 
ally. In this illustration of Cleanroom 
certification, we assume that new compo- 
nents do not have an existence or applica- 
bility outside the new system. The task is 
to certify the completed system, not its 
components, although you should know a 
great deal by now about how each compo- 
nent affects system reliability. 
Cleanroom certification is based on the 
Cleanroom approach to management and 
development, which means that system 
development will be segmented into in- 
crements, and each increment will be 
certified to the target level. Since the in- 
crements are cumulative, component in- 
98 
teractions are fully certified in the final in- 
crement. 
The data in Table 9 is based on an ac- 
tual project that resulted in approximately 
24,000 lines of Ada, of which half was 
newly developed code and half was reused 
6-om a library." The  formulas used in the 
CRM to calculate the data in Table 9 are 
given in the box on pp. 90-92. The incre- 
ments, with components given in the 
order they were implemented, are 
+ Ik twmzt  1. Components A, B, and F 
+ Imvment 2. Components A, B, F, C, 
+ Iwment  3. Components A, B, F, C, 
+ Increment 4. Components A, B, F, C, 
Version number (first column in the 
table) indicates the engineering-change 
level. Generally, an immediate-repair pol- 
icy was followed with respect to failures in 
testing and changes to the code. When- 
ever it was clear that successive failures 
were independent, testing continued 
without code changes and recompilation. 
When code changes were made, each re- 
compilation resulted in a new version of 
the system and each new version fixed one 
or more faults from the previous version. 
Because there is no failure in the last ver- 
sion, it would be overly conservative to 
enter just the number of tests run. Thus, 
the certification model's criterion for 
stopping testing is based on the last entry 
for each increment being double the ac- 
tual number of test cases that ran without 
failure. 
MTTFo (fifth column) is the estimated 
,MTTF of the software's initial version. 
Improvement factor (last column) is the 
estimated factor by which each successive 
version is an improvement over its prede- 
cessor. 
The number of test cases required for 
certification with this model depends not 
only on the number of failures but also on 
when they are observed. 
To certify increment 1, for example, we 
had to run 300 randomly generated test 
cases to reach a predicted reliability of 
0.9957 ((2)57). We detected six falures 
and corrected the faults during certifica- 
tion. 
G, H 
G, H, D, I, J 
G, H, D, I, J, E, K, L 
J A N U A R Y  1 9 9 3  
In certifjriiig increment 2,  w’e brought 
the cinnulative number oftest cases to 556 
and tlic cmndative error count to 19. We 
stopped testing when the certification 
model preclicred a 0.9968 ((2)68) reliability. 
In certifjing increment 3,  we required 
6.56 (cumdative) test cases and hrought 
the cumulative error count to 2 5 .  We 
stopped testing when the certification 
model predicted a 0.9034 ((?)PI) reliability. 
Finally, in certifviiig increment 4, the 
total number of test cases was 989, with 36 
total failures (increment 4 is, of course, the 
total system). \Vk stopped testing when 
the certification model predicted a 0.9978 
((2)78) reliability. 
A few inore metrics from this project 
inay be of interest. Of the 36 operational 
failures, seven were in or related to the 
reused library sofbare, three were Ada 
compiler errors, and sLx were a conse- 
quence of the Cleanroom team’s lack of 
putting- this system into a library and not- 
ing t l m  it has a predicted reIia1)ility of 0.99 
under the certification model. However, 
to estimate re1iat)ility to this level under 
the sampling model and to have a certain 
lcvel of confidence in the demonstration, 
we might require atlditioilal tests. Ideally, 
the system would first \,e released to a sta- 
tistically selected group of users, fix whoin 
it night amass a half niillion Miire-free 
uses, which would j u s t i ~  a claim of five 9s 
with high confidence. Next the system 
would he rilade geiierallya~,ailable and fol- 
lowed to see if, after billions of uses, it has 
earned the status “six sigma.” 
,are-reliability motiels can be app- Shv plied to sofixare development in tp- 
ical industrial settings, including the de- 
velopment of entirely new systems and 
those hased on reuse. The  models are in- 
dependent of language and developinent 
method, but, for the models to be mean- 
ingfiil, the software must he of high qua-  
ity. ‘I‘herefore. these efforts are most sig- 
nificant when they are used in the contexT 
of a high-quality development mcthodol- 
Ada knowledge. Tventy failures were 
caused by logic errors and file-related er- 
rors. Of course, all errors are sicpificant in 
certification because it is from a user per- 
spective, and the customer isn’t going to 
care who made the errors or why. ogy such as (;leanrooni software engi- 
At this point, we would be justified in i neering. 
Techniques for estimating the reliabil- 
ity of individual sofhvare units and an en- 
tire system as it is being constructed and 
pryired for release are within the reach 
of most organizations. Mathematical 
complexities not\vithstanding, reliatility 
planning and certification lend themselves 
to straightforward spreadsheet nlanipula- 
ti 011s. + 
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